Housing Wealth and Aggregate Saving by Jonathan Skinner
NBER WORKING  PAPER SERIES 
HOUSING  WEALTH  AND AGGREGATE SAVING 
Jonathan  Skinner 
Working  Paper No.  2842 
NATIONAL  BUREAU  OF ECONOMIC  RESEARCH 
1050  Massachusetts  Avenue 
Cambridge,  MA  02138 
February  1989 
This paper  was prepared  for the NBER  Conference  on Housing  and Capital 
Accumulation,  Newport,  RI, October  1988.  I am grateful  to conference 
participants,  Maxim Engers, Don Fullerton,  Patric  Hendershott,  Daniel 
McFadden,  Robert  Schwab, Kevin Terhaar,  and the Public  Economics  seminars  at 
Duke  University,  the University  of  Virginia,  and the University  of Michigan 
for helpful  comments  and suggestions,  and to Kevin Terhaar  for excellent 
research  assistance.  This paper is part  of NBER's  research  program  in 
Taxation.  Any opinions  expressed  are those  of the author  not those  of the 
National  Bureau  of Economic  Research. NBER Working Paper #2842 
February 1989 
HOUSING WEALTH AND AGGREGATE  SAVING 
ABSTRACT 
The recent appreciation in housing  value can have large  effects on 
aggregate  saving.  This paper uses a simulation model  to show that 
aggregate  saving will  decline  substantially if life cycle homeowners 
spend down their  housing  windfalls.  Homeowners with a bequest 
motive,  however, may save na  to assist their  children in buying 
the now more expensive  housing.  To test whether families  spend 
their housing capital  gains,  I use housing,  income,  and consumption 
data from the Panel Study  of Income Dynamics.  While a cross-section 
time—series  regression implies  that  housing  wealth does affect 
saving,  a fixed—effects  model finds no effect. 
Jonathan Skinner 
Department  of Economics 
University  of  Virginia 
Charlottesville, VA  22901 I.  Introduction 
The price of a  new single-family dwelling rose in real terms by 23 
percent during the 19705.1  Much of this increase was concentrated in the 
western United States, where real house prices grew by 57 percent during 
a period of 8 years (Hendershott, 1987). 
The standard life-cycle model predicts that homeowners will 
increase their consumption by some fraction of their capital gains in 
housing.  Case and Shiller (1987) suggest that the total value of 
single-family housing in 1985 was about 5.5 trillion dollars, based on 
the mean price of $90,800 for an existing house.  If homeowners 
consumed, say, 5 percent of their additional wealth  (i.e.,  the increase 
in their "permanent income'), then the 23 percent increase in housing 
value would have caused aggregate consumption to rise by 51 billion 
dollars.2  Holding income constant, this  would have caused a 36 percent 
decline in personal  saving.  Hence the windfall in housing prices could 
have been a primary cause in the saving slowdown of the late 1970s and 
early l980s. 
One objection to this explanation is that a shift in the relative 
price of housing may not affect aggregate consumption.  Any relative 
price increase implies that some gain (those  selling the good), while 
others lose (those buying the good); usually, these effects wash out 
across  the economy as a whole.  That is,  the positive wealth gain of 
homeowners could be exactly offset by the wealth loss of younger 
consumers saving for their dream home. 
The exception to this rule is when the house lasts longer than does 2 
the homeowner.  If there is a permanent increase in demand for the 
long-lived asset, the current owner can capture some of the future rent 
on the asset when  it is sold to future generations.  The question of 
whether the appreciation in housing prices should affect homeowners' 
consumption and saving therefore hinges on whether the expected life of 
their house and land exceeds their own planning  horizon.  In life cycle 
models, the answer is generally yes; current owners ultimately sell 
their house to younger generations.  As with government debt in a life 
cycle model, current homeowners enjoy wealth and additional consumption 
at the expense of future generations (Feldstein, 1977;  Chamley and 
Wright, 1987). 
As with government debt, the expansionary effect of an increase in 
housing prices disappears in models with Barro-style utility functions; 
current homeowners  internalize those higher future house prices by 
bequeathing more to future generations (Calvo, Kotlikoff, and Rodriguez, 
1979).  There is a strong similarity between the question of whether 
government bonds are net wealth and whether homeowners will  spend their 
newly realized housing wealth. 
This paper first describes the interaction between housing wealth 
and nonresidential wealth in an dynamic overlapping  generations model of 
housing and consumption choice.  The model numerically simulates the 60 
year transition path of housing prices, saving, and consumption in 
response to an initial shift in housing demand.  I allow for two 
exogenous changes as causal factors in the housing price increase of the 
1970s; the interaction of taxes and inflation leading to a low user cost 3 
of housing (Hend.rshott, 1980; Poterba, 1984), nd  the increased 
pressure of population on inelastically supplied housing  (Henderson, 
1985; Mankiw and Wail, 1989).  When bequests are ruled Out, any housing 
price increase causes a substantial short-run decline in aggregate 
saving rates as homeowners spend down their windfall  gains. 
When the bequest motive is sufficiently strong, housing 
appreciation has little or no impact on aggregate saving.  Homeowners 
bequeath  the housing capital gain to help their children afford the more 
expensive housing.  That is,  whether housing price increases affect 
consumption and saving depends on the strength of the bequest function. 
The second part of this paper uses the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics to test whether shifts in housing value have  any affect on the 
consumption (and saving) of homeowners.  The empirical evidence  is 
mixed; in standard consumption functions, house prices are estimated to 
have a small but significant impact on consumption.  When corrected for 
individual heterogeneity, however, the link between housing prices and 
consumption disappears.  Whether this finding supports a Barro-style 
model of intergenerational transfers, or whether it is indicative of 
constraints against borrowing by the elderly, is not clear. 
Section II develops a computable model of housing demand, life 
cycle consumption, and bequests.  Housing prices and supply are 
determined endogenously in a perfect foresight model with 55 
generations.  Calculations of the transition path in savings, housing 
value, and other factors are presented for tax and demographic changes. 
Section III describes the data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 4 
and empirical estimates, while Section IV concludes. 
II.  A  Model of Hpusin. Consumtion.  and Saving 
There is a  growing literature describing the effects of government 
policies on saving and welfare in the presence of fixed assets. 
Feldstein (1977) used an overlapping generations model to show that a 
newly imposed tax on land will reduce its market price by the full 
capitalized value of the land tax.  This tax harms current owners of 
land,  but benefits future owners (who can buy the  land for less).3 
Related results have been found in a general equilibrium model of fiscal 
policy (Chamley and Wright, 1987), in international trade (Eaton; 
1987,1988), and in development (Drazen and Epstein, 1988).  However, 
Calvo, Kotlikoff, and Rodriguez  (1979)  have pointed out that the 
assumption of life cycle consumers is essential for these models; 
results often disappear in the presence of Barro-style bequest 
functions. 
The model presented below solves for housing prices and saving in a 
dynamic partial  equilibrium  framework.  Individuals live  for a fixed 
lifespan  of T years and retire after year R.  They buy a house at age b, 
and live there until death; there are no borrowing  (or downpayment) 
constraints.  While the interest rate and wage rate are assumed fixed, 
the asset price of housing capital (and the spot price of housing 
services) are determined endogenously. 
The timing of the model is as follows.  Individuals begin the year 
with assets A. which earn the constant net after-tax rate of interest r. 
2. 5 
At  the end of the period, earnings and interest income are received, 
rental housing services are purchased, and consumption choices are made. 
What remains  is passed to the next period either as assets, or as 
bequests  to the most recently born generation.  Dropping the time 
subscripts for the moment, the utility function is 
U  —  (1÷b)  il[haaJ  + (l+o)Tfloln(BfllQT+b) 
(1) 
where 8 is  the rate of time preference, h  and C  are the flow of 
housing services and consumption at age i,  and a  is the expenditure 
share on housing at any age.  The bequest function depends on the level 
of the bequest, 8, as well as the price per unit of housing asset, 
faced by descendants who are born at the beginning of year T÷l and who 
must buy their house at the end of year T+b.  The bequest function 
encompasses a life cycle model  — 0),  a traditional bequest function 
— 0,  0 0),  and an approximation to a dynastic bequest model 
> 0) in which the current generation is concerned about the 
future price of housing. 
To approximate the  fixed costs involved in switching houses, it is 
assumed that individuals buy their house at age b, and live there until 
death (h 
— 
h.D,  i > b).  The down payment  is a proportion  of the 
market value of the house, Qbhb. 
Individuals rent property at an age 
less than b,  and adjust the size of their rental property costlessly 
from year  to year.4  The budget constraint is written 
[Ci 
+ Ph1(l+r)1 
+ B(l+r)T — (II 
+ 6 
+  + QT+l(1)\ 
- 
- (l)Qb\r(l+r)1 
- (l*)Qb(l+r)T  (2) 
where  is the (spot) price of rental housing, m is the maintenance 
costs incured by the property owner (assumed proportional to the spot 
price), I, Y, 
and 
Gi 
are inheritances, earnings, and government 
rebates at age i,  r is the net return paid on the mortgage as well as 
the interest rate used to discount all future income and expenditures, 
and C is  the net tax (or subsidy) on housing services.  I abstract from 
the issue of whether rental or owner-occupied housing has enjoyed 'more 
favorable tax treatment, and assume that they are perfect substitutes in 
production and that each enjoys the  same (preferential) tax advantage  0 
(Gordon,  Hines, and Summers, 1987). 
The left side of equation (2) measures full expenditures on housing 
and consumption, while the right side of (2) reflects lifetime income; 
the present value of inheritances, earnings, government rebates,  the 
returns on housing (the net service flow plus the  sale price) minus the 
costs of housing  (the downpayment, mortgage payments, and the repayment 
of the principal).  By the arbitrage condition, we know that in a model 




Using (3),  (2)  reduces to 7 
[Cj 
+ Ph](1+r)1 
+ B(l+r)T — 1 
+ (Yj+Gj)(1+r)1] 
(2') 
It is straightforward to derive the first order conditions; 
(4) 
h  —  {i±.]  (C/P)  i < b. 
_!__  (1÷5)2.b  (1÷5)1T 
hi  i.cCi  T  . 
- [T 
+ lT+l 
The derivations above have described consumption, housing, and 
bequests for the steady state.  Once a change occurs in the economic 
system, generations along the transition path will differ from one 
another, depending on their age at the time of the change.  The 




+ E  G÷j+- hbP+](l+r)] 
-  (l+r)  ll÷T+t-i 
(5) 
where D  — (1+5)  - [(1÷5)iT + 5(l+5)T/30I/(l(c) 
and  — 1  for homeowners  (in which case the consumption choice is 
constrained give the chosen quantity of housing) and  — 0  for renters 
(i < b).  It is straightforward to derive the equivalent expressions for 
housing and bequests  as functions of consumption. 
The aggregate capital stock,  which includes owner-occupied and 8 
T 
rental housing,  is expressed as A 
— 
Ajt(l+n)i,  where n is the rate 
i—i 
of population growth.  The non-residential capital stock is 
Vt 
— A 
-  Q(H + 
Se), 
and  and 
St 
are the aggregate quantity of owner-occupied and rental 
housing.  The distribution mf ownership of rental property is assumed to 
be in proportion to total assets (less owner-occupied housing) held by 
the population, so individuals at year t and age i own [A 
-  Qth.]x 
of rental property.5  It is necessary to assign 
ownership because changes in rental property asset values will also have 
wealth effects for current individuals. 
Suoply of Housing 
To allow for an upward-sloping supply of housing, land is 
introduced as a fixed factor in the production of housing units.  Land 
is assumed to grow at an exogenous rate U;  in the initial steady state, 
land growth 1'  is equal to population growth n.  When land growth is 
slower than population growth, the price of housing will rise gradually 
over time.  The housing production function is given by 
(6) 
where 1  is the technological parameter, K  physical capital invested in 
housing at tiiue t (with assumed zero deprecation rate), 7  the share 
parameter, and 
Lt — L0(l.,u)t 
is the exogenously given supply of land. 
One unit of housing X  produces one unit of housing service h. 
The 
marginal condition that the cost of a unit of housing is given by the 




The  elasticity of the housing stock with respect to the price 
(holding land constant) is 7/(l-7).  Note that a "reasonable" factor 
share of land, such as 1-7 — .25,  implies a large housing stock 
elasticity of 3.0.  Converting the housing stock elasticity to a housing 
investment elasticity (where investment is assumed to be 10 percent of 
the  stock) yields a measure of 30, which is clearly much larger than 
empirically observed  investment elasticities.  This may be a consequence 
of assuming that the elasticity of substitution is one; empirical 
evidence suggests an elasticity between  .3 and  .7 (Kau and Sirmans, 
1981).  To compensate, I assume a lower value of 7  than that implied by 
factor share payments. 
Government and Becuests 





r*T(AjtQthjt)  (8) 
and r* is the gross rate of return and T the tax on interest income. 
The government collects revenue and returns the entire amount C 
to 
each individual, in each year.  This age- and year-specific  lump-sum 
rebate therefore avoids any cross-generation transfer of tax revenue, or 
accumulation of government capital or debt. 
Bequests and inheritances are normalized so that the bequests given 
by individuals at death at the end of year t are equal to (l+n)1T times 
the inheritances received by people born at the beginning of year t+l. 
Converaence Method 10 
It is not difficult for iteration methods that solve dynamic 
rational—expectations models to veer off far from the equilibrium path 
(see Lipton, et al,  1982).  The method used below uses the condition 
that  is equal to the marginal supply cost of new housing capital. 
The initial balanced steady state is first calculated for n  — I',  and all 
relative prices are constant over time.  A permanent change is made, 
either in the relative population/land growth rate or the tax regime. 
An initial guess of the new vector of  yearly prices  is made, as 
well as the corresponding vector  where each element of  — 
XP(1-8-m). 
The actual calculations take place only from year 0 to year 
60;  beyond that point steady-state properties of the future prices are 
used to allow calculation of 
Given the guess of (Q) and  (Pr), 
individuals make consumption and 
housing choices, which in turn imply a vector of aggregate housing (X} 
in each year.  A  new vector,  is then calculated which  is the 
supply price of housing necessary to generate the quantity of housing 
demanded.  If {Q} —  then  the system has converged; the quantity 
of housing demanded given  and  is equal to the quantity 
supplied.  If not, then each price P 
is adjusted from its previous 
level depending on the value of  -  The  convergence  measure  worked 
well  for  all  the  cases  considered,  although  it  was  quite  slow  when  a 
bequest  function  was  allowed,  because  shifts  in  estimated  affected 
bequests  b  years  before,  which  in  turn  would  affect prior consumption 
and housing choices. 
Emoirical Parameters 11 
In the numerical calculations that follow, I assume that the net 
after tax rate of return is 4 percent, the time preference rate is 2 
percent, the population growth rate 2 percent, and the cost of 
maintenance 20 percent of P.  King and Fullerton (1984) calculate an 
effective tax rate T equal  to 37 percent.  While the subsidy to 
homeownership varies with ma'rginal  (or average) income tax brackets, I 
will assume that 9—  0  in the initial equilibrium; the return to 
homeownership  is simply untaxed. 
Individuals are assumed to live for 55 years, and retire after 45 
years.  The earnings path for a white high-school graduate is taken from 
Lillard (1983), and all figures are expressed in thousands of dollars. 
Houses are purchased in year 30,  and the housing preference parameter a 
is set at  .29;  this is the ratio of housing expenses  to total 
expenditures from the Consumer Expenditure Survey in 1980 (Statistical 
Abstract, 1987,  p. 430).  The production parameter 7 is assumed to be 
.1,  which yields an elasticity of supply for the stock of housing equal 
to .11;  if,  for example, investment is 5 percent of the total stock, the 
investment elasticity is 2.2,  a measure consistent with the long-run 
housing elasticity (Topel and Rosen, 1988).  The production parameter 
was calculated by normalizing P — 1  in the initial steady state. 
The parameter  is predetermined to approximate tt+b'  where 
is the generation t indirect utility function.  From the direct 
utility function, and denoting h as the  steady state value of housing, 
— (l+r)l(l+n)T,  which turns out to be roughly 8.0 for the base 
case simulations.  For reasons of stability, the model does not allow 12 
for a  full Barro-style utility function;  — 0.5 < 1.0. 
There are a number of explanations for the jump in housing prices 
during the past two decades.  The first explanation is based  on the 
interaction of high inflation rates and the taxation of nominal interest 
income which led to negative real after tax interest rates during the 
late 1970s (Feldstein, 1980;  Summers, 1981).  Poterba (1984) developed a 
dynamic model of housing with  variable supply, and explained much of the 
increase in housing value during the late 1970s as a consequence of the 
high effective tax rate on nonresidential investment.  The most obvious 
way to replicate the experience of the l970s is to increase r while 
holding  B constant.  The problem with this experiment is that it 
confounds the effect on consumption of an interest rate shift with the 
effect of housing price shifts.  Both will lead to a sharp decline in 
saving rates.  To hold the interest rate effect constant (so  the 
interest rate is fixed), the housing tax differential is increased by 20 
percent by shifting from B — 0  to B — - .20. 
The taxation explanation alone cannot successfully explain  the 
pattern of housing prices in the l980s (1-iendershott, 1988).  Despite the 
substantial fall in inflation rates and marginal tax rates, housing 
prices have fallen only slightly, and in some areas have continued to 
rise (Case and Shiller, 1987).  A  second explanation focuses on 
demographic changes which  increased the number of potential renters and 
homeowners during the 1970s and early l980s.  Between 1975 and 1985,  the 
population expanded by 11 percent, while the number of household 
increased by 22 percent.  Standard urban models imply that the price of 13 
scarce land/housing cotweniently close to employment centers will be bid 
up as households  or population grows (Henderson, 1985).  Mankiw and Weil 
(1989) argue that it was the increased housing demand by baby boomers 
that led to the sharp rise in housing prices during the late 1970s.  To 
capture general demographic effects in this model, I assume that the 
growth rate of land V falls permanently behind the growth rate of 
population n.6  That is,  the per capita supply of land (and,  over time, 
housing) declines, and housing prices rise, as population growth exceeds 
land growth.  The reason why land growth is reduced rather than 
population growth increased is to hold constant the age composition of 
the population.  Increasing population growth will increase the relative 
number of young  people,  which by itself will increase aggregate  saving  rates in life cycle models.1 
Simulation Results 
The  simulation model was calculated for both the life cycle case 
(with no  bequest  motive) and for the bequest case.  Figure 1 displays 
the impact on house prices of reducing  U  from 0.0  to  -0.2.  Paths  (A) 
and  (8)  show the housing price shift for the life cycle  (LC)  and bequest 
(Beq)  cases 
respectively.  The effect of taxation on housing prices 
depends only marginally on whether homeowners have a bequest motive; 
housing prices jump  by roughly 16 percent and settle close to their new 
steady state values. 
The aggregate saving rate in the simulation model is patterned 
after the national  income accounts measure of saving.  Income is 
earnings plus the return on housing (PX)  and nonhousing capital, and 14 
government rebates, while saving is income less consumption less housing 
expenditures.  Initially, the aggregate saving rate in the economy 
with a  bequest motive  (20.5 percent) is higher than the saving rate in a 
life cycle economy (15.3  percent). 
Figure 2 shows the change in the aggregate saving rate as a 
consequence of the housing subsidy.  In the life cycle case  (A), 
aggregate saving declines by 6.1 percentage points as current 
generations spend down their windfall; over time the saving rate 
declines permanently by 2 percentage points.  While the saving rate for 
the economy with a bequest motive still declines (s),  the magnitude of 
the change is only one-third that for the life cycle economy.  In the 
long-rim, the saving rate is 1.  percent below  the initial steady state 
value.  The bequest function dampens and can potentially offset the life 
cycle response to the housing price appreciation. 
The converse of the policy presented above is to increase the 
implicit tax on housing services.  One possibility, for example, is to 
assess a tax on estimated housing service flows.  Separate simulations 
(not reported) indicate that short-run saving rates would rise 
(substantially in the life cycle case, less so with a bequestmotive)  in 
response to the equalization of capital taxes on housing and nonhousing 
capital (i.e., r — 0). 
The impact of an increasing pressure of population on land (i.e., a 
reduction in the growth rate of land by 0.5 percent) is to raise housing 
prices by 15 percent for both the life cycle (C) and bequest  (D) model 
(Figure  1).  Given that the per capita stock of land is falling over 15 
time, the perfectly foreseeable housing price will grow at a constant 
rate ineach  year.  Aggregate saving rates shifts in response to the 
housing price changes are shown in Figure 2 for the life cycle model (C) 
and the bequest model  (D).  Once again, a housing price appreciation 
causes current life cycle homeowners to spend down their wealth, thereby 
reducing aggregate saving.  However, a housing price appreciation causes 
homeowners with a bequest motive to permanently increase their saving to 
provide for their childrens' more expensive housing. 
The long run impact of housing prices on capital accumulation 
depends on the behavior of the consumers who enjoy the windfall housing 
profits; do they spend down their capital gains or save them?  To 
measure the behavior of this group, I turn next to an empirical test of 
the impact of house value on consumption and saving. 
III.  Ernirical Estimates of Housing Value and Savina 
A  number of time-series studies have estimated that housing wealth 
has a positive effect on consumption.  In particular, the coefficients 
from Bhatia (1987) and Hendershott and Peek (1987) suggest that the 
marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth is between 4 and 5 
cents.  Krumm and  Miller (1986)  used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) to compare  the  changes in asset income of homeowners with 
renters.  While nonhousing saving fell temporarily following a house 
purchase, homeowners on average saved more in nonhousirig  assets than 
renters, holding income constant.  Their evidence is consistent with 
individual-specific saving effects; those  who save are also more likely 16 
to  buy houses. 
The empirical analysis below also uses the PSID to test the effect 
of housing windfalls  on consumption.  The primary sample was selected in 
the following way.  Observations were excluded if (1)  there were changes 
in the composition of family heads during the years 1973-83;  (ii) 
families rented or had moved during the period 1976-81; (iii)  there were 
missing values for selected variables; (iv)  the reported house value was 
less than $4000, and (v)  if income during any year 1973-81 was equal to 
zero or exceeded $99,999.  One-thousand and fifty-six families remained 
in the primary sample. 
In the past, researchers have used food consumption in the PSID as 
a proxy for total consumption.  It is straightforward, however,  to take 
advantage of alternative consumption indicators reported in the PSID to 
construct a better measure of consumption (Skinner, 1987).  In 
particular, the survey reports utility payments, restaurant spending, 
food at home, and the number of automobiles.8  These expenditures 
correspond to categories in the Consumer Expenditure Surveys  (CEX)  of 
1972-73 and 1982.  The strategy used here is to regress total 
consumption in the CEX on these independent variables; the regression 
coefficients are then used to weight the corresponding PSID variables  to 
generate predicted total consumption.  Using  the full set of consumption 
indicators increases the explanatory power from as little as 26 percent 
of total variance  (using food consumption alone) to almost 60 percent 
with the full set of variables.9 
From the Consumer Expenditure Surveys of 1972-73 and 1982,  the 17 
dependent variable, consumption, was constructed to be total consumption 
expenditures less automobile and furniture purchases and mortgage 
payments, plus an imputed 6 percent return on the house value.'0 
The regression to predict consumption from the 1972-73 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey, which used annual data,  is 
C — 1935 + l.29*Food  + 3.32*Away +  680*Auto  + 2.97*Utility 
(36)  (59)  (82)  (21)  (37) 
R2 — .59;  N  — 14499 
where t-statistics are in parentheses, Food measures  food expenditures 
at home, Away measures food away from home, Auto is the number of 
automobiles up to a maximum of 2, and utility measures utility payments. 
Using similar notation, predicted consumption from the 1982 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (on a quarterly basis but adjusted to annual terms) 
C — 2173 + l.63*Food  + 3.62*Away  + l9l4*Auto + 2.60*Utility 
(9)  (25)  (38)  (12)  (21) 
R2 —  .59;  N — 3431 
Predicted consumption was constructed using both the 1972-73 and 
the 1982 survey results, with appropriate adjustments using the CPI. 
Average consumption for the sample is presented in the 5th and 6th 
columns of Table 1.  All consumption and income variables used in the 
PSID regressions are in terms of constant 1981 dollars. 
The survey  asked for the respondent's subjective value of their 
house in each year  (presumably consumption decisions are based on the 
subjective value of the house).  The average house value is presented  in 18 
Table 1.  In nominal terms, housing valuation increased by 76 percent; 
when deflated by the CPI,  housing prices increased by only 10 percent. 
However, the CPI is likely to overstate the true cost of living increase 
for homeowners, since it accounts for higher house prices facing 
prospective homeowners.  An alternative measure is the GNP deflator; 
using this adjustment, house prices rose by 18 percent during 1976-81; 
during the period 1976-80, housing prices increased at an average annual 
rate of 4.3 percent in real terms. 
As a first exploratory step in measuring the impact of housing 
prices on consumption, it is useful simply to regress the individual log 
difference in consumption between 1976 and 1981 on the log difference in 
income and the log difference in house value.  Because the sample is 
restricted to those who did not move, the change in house value should 
correspond to asset revaluation of an existing structure, although the 
individual may have added home improvements (or allowed the house to 
depreciate).  The regression yielded the following coefficients (with 
t-statistics in parentheses); 
a —  - .059  +  .l33  -  .0l0  R2 — .079 
(7.6)  (8.1)  (0.6)  (9) 
That is,  the simplest model implies that individuals' consumption 
patterns are sensitive to income changes ('i)  but not to changes in 
housing valuation  (1i).  One potential objection to this regression is 
that consumption should respond only to the unpredictible cornponent  of 
housing price changes.  To separate the unpredictable  from the 19 
predictable components of housing price changes, I assume that 
homeowners forecast future price changes with  an AR(2) model.  Using 
1976-78 data yields a predictive equation equal to ln(h) 
— .654  + 
.52lln(h1) 
+ .423ln(h2) 
with t-statistics of 3.8, 17.8, and 14.4, 
2 
respectively; R  — .77.  The predicted change in the housing price 
between 1976 and 1981 (calculated  using the AR(2) model) is denoted by 
h, the unexpected change by h.  It is interesting to note that the 
average value of  was less than zero, suggesting that the house prices 
in 1981 may not have been unanticipated.  A regression similar to 
Equation (9) was run with h  and  entered separately; 
O —  -.054  +  .l33  -  .032h  -  .0O3  — .060 
(5.5)  (8.1)  (1.0)  (0.1)  (10) 
It seems clear that changes in housing prices, whether expected or 
unexpected, do not have a large impact  on consumption in these simple 
regressions.  One hypothesis would be that the bequest motive just 
offsets the life cycle wealth effect, so that saving is left unchanged. 
A test of this "weak bequest" hypothesis is to include a variable  (1i  x 
family  size); if the bequest motive were tronger for families with more 
children, one might expect this coefficient to be negative.  However, 
the variable is insignificant. 
The next step is to take advantage of the full data set by forming 
a combined cross-section time-series data set.  From the theoretical 
model, it can be shown that the main determination of consumption is 
lifetime wealth (or permanent income).  I attempt to provide an accurate 20 
measure of permanent  income by including (logged) current income, 
current earnings,'1  three years of lagged income, and next year's income. 
An accurate measure of lifetime wealth is particularly important in this 
equation,  since housing purchases are likely to be highly correlated 
with lifetime wealth (some consumption studies in the past have even 
used housing value as a proxy for permanent income!).  While the life 
cycle model implies that the marginal propensity to consume out of 
lifetime wealth is a function of age,  interactive terms of income with 
age were insignificant, and were therefore excluded.  To adjust for 
demographic effects, age, age2, the sex of the household head, and 
family size were included in the regression.  Finally, the dependent 
variable, log(consumption), is constructed using the 1982 weights, 
although the regression results were similar when  the 1972 weights were 
used. 
A  parsimonious regression is presented in the column labeled (1)  in 
Table 2.  The impact of a temporary change in (log)  income on current 
(log)  consumption is 0.06,  which is roughly consistent with the 
predictions of a life cycle model for a younger individual.  The 
predicted change in consumption as a result of a permanent (5 year) 
change in income, .22,  is less than that predicted by the life cycle 
model.  The coefficient on the house value is significant; it implies 
that a 23 percent increase in the market value of housing would increase 
consumption by 1.4 percent. 
One disadvantage with the model in Column (1)  is that it 
potentially confounds two effects.  If interest rates affect both 21 
housing prices and consumption directly (through the Euler equation), 
the coefficient on housing could confound these two effect. 
Furthermore, business cycles could both depress housing prices and 
increase consumption (conditional on income), leading to further bias. 
To measure the direct impact of interest rate changes, dummy variables 
for each year are also included in the column labeled  (2).  Conditional 
on lagged, current, and future income, consumption rates were higher 
during the late l970s, a period of low real after-tax interest rates. 
The pooled cross-section time-series regression coefficients from 
column (2)  suggest that a rise in real housing prices of 23 percent is 
predicted to reduce consumption by 1.4 percent.  Since these figures 
apply only to homeowners, the estimate must be adjusted before applying 
it to aggegate assumption.  Noting that 64 percent of all housing units 
were owner-occupied in 1983,  and that homeowners enjoyed a median family 
income double those who rented in 1983 (Statistical Abstract  1987,  p. 
712).  Then the adjusted drop in aggregate consumption is predicted to 
be  $26 billion in 1985 (or 18 percent of personal saving), assuming that 
(a) consumption is proportional to income and (b) renters' consumption 
is unaffected by housing prices.  The meaured effects are somewhat less 
than those implied by the pure life cycle model. 
Correctinz for Heteroseneity among Homeowners 
Heterogeneity may affect these estimates for two reasons.  First, 
there may be some selectivity bias from choosing only those who did not 
move for the entire period.  If,  for example, those individuals with 
consumption most responsive to housing wealth are also most likely to 22 
"cash out" their house (by moving to a less expensive house in another 
region, for example), then restricting the sample to "stayers" will bias 
the results.  The standard Heckman method is used to adjust for this 
bias; the inverse Mills ratio for "stayers" is calculated from a probit 
which explains whether individuals move or not.'-2  This ratio is then 
interacted with the housing wealth variable and entered independently in 
the regression on consumption; results are presented in Table 2,  Column 
(3).  The interactive term is positive implying that the larger the 
unobservable component that predicts the family will move,  the higher 
the inverse Mills ratio, and hence the smaller the response of 
consumption to housing value.  This interactive term alone is not 
significant, although the joint test that both the Mills ratio and the 
interactive term are zero is rejected at the 0.01 level (F(2,63l7) — 
16.57). 
A second source of heterogeneity is that some individuals in the 
sample may be "spendthrifts" who both consume more relative to income, 
and live in larger houses.  Hence including house value on the RHS could 
lead to a spurious correlation, since both consumption and housing will 
reflect the unobservable heterogeneity.  To correct for this correlation 
between the unobservable effect and the independent variables, a fixed 
effect model of consumption is estimated.  Individual effects are 
removed from the least squares regression by subtracting each variable's 
household-specific  (arithmetic or logrithmetic) average.  This is 
equivalent to including a dummy variable for each family in the 
regression.  Because of this,  variables which are constant for each 23 
family  over time, such as sex or the Mills ratio, are excluded from the 
regression.  Column (1)  in Table 3 reports regression results for a 
simple model explaining log consumption as a function of a limited 
number of variables.  While income and family size remain signficant, 
house value does not have a signficant effect on consumption.  The 
second regression reports results for the model including year dummies; 
once again there is no evidence that house value has an effect on 
consumption. 
What can one conclude from these sets of regressions?  One 
interpretation would be that house value has no impact on consumption, 
and that regressions from Table 2 (which imply that house values 
affect consumption) reflect spurious correlation between the two 
variables.  However, the fixed effect regressions may not be as 
statistically powerful as the non-fixed effect regressions, since the 
former are based only on within-family variation, and ignore potentially 
useful variation between families. 
IV.  Conclusion 
This paper has suggested that the rise in housing prices during the 
past decades can have an important impact on long run capital 
accumulation.  In particular, if consumers follow life cycle patterns  of 
consumption, the increased house values is predicted to reduce saving 
rates in theoretical models with rational expectations and perfect 
foresight.  The saving effects are moderated in the presence of a 
bequest motive; individuals concerned about their children  facing higher 24 
housing  prices leave larger bequests rather than spending their windfall 
gains. 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics was used to assess the impact of 
housing values on consumption.  While one set of regressions suggested a 
small but significant effect, another set which corrected for individual 
differences across families suggested that shifts in house value had no 
effect on consumption during the later 1970s. 
What  light do these results shed on the theoretical models of 
saving behavior?  The latter regressions support Ricardian equivalence; 
homeowners do not consume their housing wealth.  But consumers may be 
unable to spend down their housing wealth.  While second mortgages are 
an increasingly popular method for unlocking housing equity (Manchester 
and Poterba, 1987), retirees may face difficulties in meeting mortgage 
payments.  There are few reverse annuities that allow elderly homeowners 
to spend part of their housing equity (Manchester, 1987).  Another 
possibility is that consumers do not view their capital gains as 
permanent.  Current homeowners may not wish to risk an over-leveraged 
house  if prices do ultimately fall.  Finally, homeowners may have grown 
accustomed  to an accelerating pattern of housing price increases, so 
that the house price changes anticipated for the late 1970s were already 
reflected in 1976 (and later) consumption choices. 25 
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Table  1:  House  Value  and Real Consui.otion  1976-81: 
Non-ovin Ho.eovners 
ConsuIption  Consump  tions 
House  Value  House  Value  House Value  (1972-73 Coeffs)  (1982 Coeffs) 
Year  (No.ina.1)  (GNP  Del.)  (CPI  Del.)  [CPI]  [CPu 
1976  30,772  45,860  49,157  17,905  17,331 
1977  34,608  48,335  51,964  18,195  17,618 
1978  39,158  50,987  54,614  18,403  17,857 
1979  43,919  52,535  55,036  18,090  17,468 
1980  49,696  54,491  54,852  17,924  17,164 
1981  54,161  54,161  54,161  17,010  16,191 
N — 1056. All real  prices  expressed  in  terms of 1981  dollars. 29 
Table  2:  Constion Rearessions 1976-81 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Coaff.  t-stat.  Coaff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat. 
Income 
.0361  5.29  .0396  5.79  .0402  5.90 
Income. 
0273  3.87  .0283  4.01  .0285  4.04 
Income  .0450  5.74  .0438  5.58  .0436  5.58 
Income 
.0672  8.59  .0650  8.13  .0645  8.09 
Income+i 
.0444  6.97  .0427  6.68  .0411  6.45 
House  Value  .0625  11.71  .0622  11.66  .0650  3.63 
Age  .0085  5.59  .0084  5.35  .0094  5.95 
Age2  - .102E-3  7.00  - .996E-4  6.41  - .109E-3  6.96 
Family  Size  .0448  22.83  .0447  22.73  .0477  23.48 
Sex (1 if  female) 
- .1159  11.57  -.1170  11.66  - .1108  11.01 
Earnings  .0004  0.34  - .0005  0.34 
YR1976  .0345  3.36  .0346  3.37 
YR1977  .0500  4.87  .0503  4.91 
YR1978  .0616  6.01  .0618  6.05 
YR1979  .0483  4.74  .0486  4.77 
YR1980  .0441  4.33  .0442  4.35 
Mills Ratio  .0106  0.05 
Mills x Hse Val  .0044  0.21 
C  6.5114  6.4780  6.4828 
a2  .487  .525  .528 
Note:  N — 6336.  Dependent variable  is the log of consumption  (1982 weights). 30 
Table  3:  Conaition ReEreasiona With Fixed  Effects.  1976-81 
(1) 
Coeff.  t-stat. 
(2) 
Coeff.  t-stat. 
Income 
.0478  8.52  .0412  7.44 
House Value  - .0004  0.06  - .0107  0.50 
Family  Size  .0425  11.89  .0341  9.34 
YR1976  .0537  8.24 
YR1977  .0703  10.89 
YR1978  .0822  12.79 
YR1979  .0663  10.42 
Ya1980  .0543  8.58 
Mills x House  Value  - .0091  037 
C  .0000  - .05447 
a2  .039  .068 
Notes:  N — 6336.  Family-specific  means  removed from  each  of  the independent 
variables  (except the year dummies) as well  as from  the dependent variable,  he 
log of  consumption  (calculated  using 1982  weights). 31 
1  The price of housing  is assumed to be the price index for new 
single  dwelling  structures,  adjusted by the GNP deflator. 
2  Time-series  estimates  of the effect of housing  inclusive wealth on 
consumption  are 4.6  cents  (Bhatia, 1987) and 4.0 cents  (Hendershott 
and Peek,  1987) per dollar. 
Since the land tax  is rebated,  the tax inclusive price of land 
for a particular  generation  falls.  Alternatively,  the owners of the 
land  make no profit on the land  but  they enjoy the proceeds of the 
lump sum rebate. 
4The PSID reports that  in the total sample, roughly 20 percent  of 
renters move to a new location  each year.  For the sample of 
homeowners  in 1976/77,  only 27 percent moved at any time during  the 
four year period 1978-81.  See loannides  (1987) and Henderson  and 
loannides  (1987) for a more general model of housing  tenure choice. 
If rental property  exceeds non-owner-occupied  capital,  the limit is 
set to one. 
6  The model captures  a permanent  perfectly  anticipated change  in 
housing  prices.  In Mankiw  and Weil (1989), the demographic  change is 
temporary, but because  individuals  appear to be myopic,  they treat the 
change  as if it were permanent. 
There  are other explanations  for the housing price increases. 
Case (1987) suggests  that a speculative bubble  is the only factor that 
can explain the sharp jump in Boston housing  prices.  Hendershott 
(1988) favors an explanation  in which a slowdown  in housing 
construction  productivity  leads to a secular rise in housing  prices. 
One disadvantage  with  using  utility  payments  is that the real 
price  of gas and electricity  grew by 33 percent  during  the 1970s. 
Similar  regressions  are reported  in Skinner (1987).  In those 
regressions,  however, house  value was used as a  consumption  indicator, 32 
which  is clearly  not appropriate  for this exercise. 
'°  It iight  appear  that the  imputed housing  flow will contaminate 
this measure of  total consumption.  However,  the instruments used to 
predict  consumption  are independent  of changes  in housing  values,  so 
the consumption  measure  will not bias the results. 
"The log of earnings was set to zero when earnings were zero. 
12The probit  equation  for whether  individuals moved or not is 
M  —  -2.47  -  .045Y + .034LEarn  +  .27lLFmsz  +  .005(H/Y) 
(3.1)  (0.6)  (2.0)  (7.0)  (0.2) 
+ .162Y + .O28Earn  -  .OO2Fmsz 
(2.0)  (1.8)  (0.1)  N  — 1465 
where  M is the probit  index as to whether the family moves during 
1976-81, Y  is log of income, Earn is earnings, Fmsz is family  size, 
H/Y is the ratio of 1976 housing  value  to 1976 current  income, and L 
denotes  changes over the 5 year period.  This  sample is expanded  to 
include those who owned a house during 1976 and 1977, but who may have 
moved or sold  their house  between  1978 and 1981.  There were 393 
movers and 1072 who stayed.  See Venti and Wise (1987), loannides 
(1987), and Henderson  and loannides  (1987). 3
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